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Abstract 
Managing the development and evolution of a system-of-systems (SoS) capability remains a challenge due to, among other 
reasons, the complex interdependencies between participating systems. One form of complexity stems from the tendency of 
interdependencies to propagate between systems; disruptions in the development of one system may propagate to other dependent 
systems in successive cycles, creating schedule and cost overruns. Event tree methods and Bayesian Networks (BNs) are used in 
this paper to quantify development interdependencies between systems and assess cascading development risks. In addition the 
approach also allows inputs (e.g. development failure rates of participating systems) to be updated automatically for better 
decision-making. A primary output of the approach is the quantification of development interdependencies and the identification 
of critical systems with respect to propagating effect levels. This method when applied to a synthetic problem, as a proof-of-
concept, demonstrates the robustness of the proposed approach in tackling risk interaction that arises from the cascading effects 
of development disruptions and clearly illustrates that the propagating effects depend not only on SoS architecture, but on 
development failure rates of participating systems as well. The outcomes of the analysis provide a support for decision makers to 
manage risk in development of a SoS with complex interdependencies. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Georgia Institute of Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
A system of systems (SoS) is a collection of distributed systems that operate independently but that also interact 
with one another to achieve a capability not achievable by individual systems alone (in contrast, in a monolithic 
system, hardware or software components are integrated to form a single entity). SoSs are found in various domains, 
such as aerospace, defense, and communication networks [1], [2] and are distinguished by their operational and 
managerial independence [3]. Whilst giving a SoS the characteristic capability of achieving its objectives, this 
interdependency can also cause failures to cascade through the SoS thereby causing potential development delays. 
Therefore, these properties of independence and interdependence make project management of SoSs challenging 
during the development process. For example, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF, or F-35) continues to face schedule and 
cost overruns, partially due to the cascading effects of component systems failing to meet requirements. Many 
surveys show the schedule and cost overruns are serious problems in a SoS, especially defense programs. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report estimated that the 98 Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
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(MDAPs) from FY2010 collectively overran their schedule by an average of 22 months and budgets by $402 billion 
[4]. According to an independent report by the British Ministry of Defense, defense programs overran their schedule 
by an average of 40% leading to overall cost increases by 40% [5]. Therefore, an adequate assessment of the 
cascading effects of risk among interdependent systems during the development process has the potential to reduce 
cost and schedule overruns. The rationale behind this is that such analyses can reduce risk of a project management. 
Several approaches have been developed to analyze systems interdependencies during operations and associated 
propagating impacts in different domains [6], [7], [8]. These studies focus on analyzing operational 
interdependencies between systems using data that is more readily available than the data required for analyzing 
development dependencies. In such scenarios researchers are restricted to carrying out analysis with limited 
information such as sparse data or expert opinions, and are hence struggling to quantify development dependencies. 
Therefore new approaches are needed not only to quantify the development dependency strengths with cascading 
system failures in a SoS during the system development but also, to deal with uncertainty. 
In this paper, we propose a method to quantify the development dependency strengths between system builders. 
The method employs Bayesian Networks (BNs) to represent interdependencies between system builders in a SoS 
capability development context. The BN uses two inputs: 1) development failure rates of system builders and 2) 
dependency strength between system builders. BNs are particularly suited to such problems given their efficacy for 
representing causal relationships between systems involving uncertainty. Uncertainty is represented in a BN using 
beta distributions which increases the robustness of model outcomes. The BN is used on a synthetic problem to 
compute the impact of interdependencies between system builders. Results are described in the context of their use 
by decision makers to manage risk in development of a SoS with complex interdependencies. 
2. Development Interdependency Modeling for System-of-Systems (SoS) 
There are two ways to develop a new SoS: 1) integrate only existing off-the-shelf systems or 2) deploy nascent 
and inchoate systems with existing ones. In many cases, the latter is selected for the sake of the advancement of SoS 
wide capability. It is important for project managers to effectively estimate possibilities of developing new systems. 
However, estimating development possibilities for all activities is a challenge due to the complex interdependencies 
between systems activities organized for a SoS capability. In this paper, we use failure rates of systems activities to 
represent possibility levels for a system development. Once a failure rate of each activity (in consideration with its 
interdependent activities) has been estimated it can be used for better decision making to reduce schedule and budget 
overruns. 
We develop an integrated simulation model to estimate failure rates of system activities in a SoS. The model 
identifies the system which is most susceptible to disruption propagation impacts. The outputs from the integrated 
simulation model are the estimated failure rates of all activities at scheduled time. 
The integrated simulation model is comprised of five principal steps (Fig. 1) as described by the following: 
Bayesian analysis for 
assessing propagating 
effects to each activity
Strategic
actions
Failure rates for 
all activities
Dependent strength
assessment
Initial failure rates
Results 
analysis
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the integrated simulation model for development interdependency analysis 
2.1. Inputs – Initial development failure rates and dependency strength 
The first step in the modeling development interdependency analysis is to estimate initial development failure 
rates and the dependency strength of activities. Initial development failure rates of system activities depend on 
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technology maturity levels and the system builder’s potential for the new system development. If a system builder 
has mature technologies or high potential to develop a new system, then initial development failure rate for that 
activity is low. It is important to account for uncertainty in the model and data in order to generate reliable results. 
Hence beta distributions are used to represent initial development failure rates to address uncertainties. Beta 
distributions are a family of continuous probability distributions defined on the interval between 0 and 1, 
parameterized by two positive shape parameters (  and ). There are several reasons for justifying the use of beta 
distributions in the proposed model. First, beta distribution allows for the representation of various types of 
probability information [9]. Fig. 2 presents various shapes of beta distributions according to two positive shape 
parameters. Second, when probability information is unavailable, the beta family is the best choice for determining 
the most conservative probability information [10]. 
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Fig. 2. Various shapes of beta distributions 
The second major input, dependency strength, plays an important role in analysing propagating effects among 
interconnected systems. We use requirement connectivity matrix and system maturity levels to quantify dependency 
strength between system activities. In this paper, dependency refers to requirements dependency. We assume that 
the individual component systems in our SoS are built independently. If there does not occur any problems during 
system development, development of the component systems should not have propagation of disruption between 
each other. However, if a disruption of the system development happens, then this disruption may propagate. For 
example, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and a satellite are constituent systems of a SoS. One of the SoS 
requirements is to send/receive data with high bandwidth between UAV and the satellite. To achieve this 
requirement, system builders should communicate with each other to develop compatible data transmission systems. 
This dependency strength is called ‘requirement dependency’. The dependency strength represents the chance that 
disruption in the activities of the UAV builder will propagate to the Satellite builder. The detailed process to 
estimate requirement dependency strength is as follows. 
Connectivity matrix for requirement dependency 
The connectivity matrix is a column matrix indicating which requirements of a system depend on the other 
systems. Suppose in our last example, the UAV and the Satellite have three requirements each and one pair of 
requirements is dependent. If UAV’s 3rd requirement is dependent on the Satellite’s 1st requirement, then 
connectivity matrix for UAV and the Satellite can be represented by ConUAV Sat=[0 0 1]T and ConSat UAV=[1 0 0]T 
respectively. The connectivity matrix only allows binary entries 0 or 1, where ‘0’ represents independence and ‘1’ 
represents independence. 
Conditional probability of a requirement failure given a system builder failure 
The second step is to quantify requirement dependency strength through estimating conditional probabilities of 
requirement failures using technology maturity scales. In the development process for high technology systems, 
system builders may not deliver new systems on time due to lack of technology maturity. In this paper, we use a 
system-focused prescriptive metric entitled System Readiness Level (SRL) to estimate the technology maturity 
scales of a requirement. A requirement can be hierarchically decomposed into several systems needed to achieve the 
requirement capability. Fig. 3 represents the hierarchical representation of requirements and the capability of an 
entire system.  
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Fig. 3. Hierarchical representation of an entire system 
SRL is defined as a function of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) of component systems and Integration 
Readiness Levels (IRLs) of the integrations. TRLs are a systematic metric/measurement, invented by NASA that 
supports assessments of the maturity of a particular technology and the consistent comparison of maturity between 
different types of technology [11]. IRLs provide an integration specific metric to determine the integration maturity 
between two or more component systems [12]. Requirements can be interpreted as systems with several component 
systems. Therefore we can estimate the technology maturity scales for requirements using SRL metrics. In order to 
address uncertainty into SRL metrics, Tan, et. al. [13] developed a probabilistic approach which provides a SRL 
probability distribution incorporated information of relative frequency of the TRL/IRL values provided by system 
evaluators.  
SRL can take values between 0 and 1. A system with a higher SRL value represents a matured system. The 
matured system has a smaller residual of the SRL value, unity minus a SRL value. We use mean values of SRL 
probability distributions to calculate the conditional probability of a requirement failure by normalizing residuals of 
SRL values for all requirements. If three requirements of UAV have SRL values of 0.4, 0.8, and 0.5 respectively, the 
conditional probability of requirement 1 failure given the UAV builder failure is as follows. 
   
 (1 0.4)( | ) 0.463 (1 0.4) (1 0.8) (1 0.5)
1
SRL residual of req1P UAV F UAV FReq1
SRL residual of reqi
i
  (1) 
After applying this process to all requirements, we can obtain a matrix including conditional probabilities of all 
requirements, P(UAVReq=Failure | UAV=Failure)=[0.46 0.15 0.39]. 
Quantify requirement dependency strengths 
Requirement dependency strengths are obtained by multiplying the connectivity and conditional probability 
matrices. The dependency strength represents the probability that disruption of a system builder will propagate to its 
dependent system builder. The failure of UAV builder may propagate to the satellite builder with the probability of 
0.39 as calculated in the following equation: 
 ( | ) 0.39Dependency Strength P UAV F UAV F ConReqUAV Sat UAV Sat  (2) 
2.2. An Interdependency Analysis of a System-of-Systems using a Bayesian Network 
A Bayesian Network 
A Bayesian Network is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) whose nodes are random variables and whose edges 
directly influence one another. Local probabilities represent the nature of the dependence of each variable (node) on 
its parents. Probability information in a Bayesian Network model is defined through these local distributions. A 
node with no parent node in the Bayesian Network model denotes a random variable and its associated probability 
distribution. A node with its parent node(s) can be represented as a conditional probability distribution (CPD). The 
first important step to build the BN is to construct the network of interests while considering dependencies between 
nodes and to estimate failure rates of nodes. Requirement dependency strength and failure rates of system builders 
mentioned in Section 2.1 are used to form the BN. 
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In this paper, a Bayesian Network (BN) is adopted to analyze interdependencies between systems. The BN can 
graphically represent interactions among multiple components and provide the basic structure for analyzing and 
visualizing the development SoS model. The BN is a probabilistic tool that evaluates networks of systems with 
respect to disruption propagation in developing systems for a SoS. The evaluation not only identifies critical 
components from a risk perspective, but also can show disruption and dependency effects on total expected 
development time of the SoS capability.  
 
Propagating system failures through interdependencies 
There are two sources of system failure in a SoS context: inherent and propagating. If a system fails on its own, 
then it is called an inherent failure. However, if a system failure is caused by propagating effects from 
interdependent systems, it is then called a propagating failure. It is therefore important to fuse all failure information, 
inherent and propagated.  
Fig. 4 shows a simple Bayesian Network where the node Y has N parent nodes. This paper focuses on binomial 
failures for a node. For example, each node in the Bayesian Network can only take values 0 or 1 to represent the 
status of the component as ‘failure’ or ‘working’, respectively. This is a limiting factor of the approach which we 
will revisit at the conclusion.  
  
X1 Xn
Y
…
 
Fig. 4. A Bayesian Network representation 
Consider that each node has its own inherent failure rate defined by a beta distribution and node Y has n parents, 
X1…Xn. A Beta distribution is parameterized by two positive shape parameters, denoted by sn+1 and sn+nn+1. These 
two positive parameters are interpreted as the number of failures and survivors respectively when sn and nn are 
integers [14]. Let PA(Y) denote the set of the parents of the node Y, i.e.{ X1…Xn }. According to the law of total 
probability, the propagating failure rate of node Y is 
 
( 0) ( ( ) )p Y CPD p PA Y kk
k  
(3) 
where  ( 0 ( ) )CPD p Y PA Y kk , k is all combination of parent node values. For example, if PA(Y) includes two 
parent nodes (X1 and X2), then {{0,0},{0,1},{1,0},{1,1}}k . Therefore, a node with two parent nodes has four CPDk 
values. CPDk values here indicate the dependency strength of a failure propagating to a dependent system. For 
instance, if node X1 (or X2) fails, then node Y has 30% (or 20%) of chance to fail by a propagating effect of the node 
X1 (or X2) failure. In this case, all CPDk values are determined: ( 0 1, 0) 0.31 2p Y X X , ( 0 0, 1) 0.21 2p Y X X , 
( 0 0, 0) 01 2p Y X X , and ( 0 1, 1) 0.51 2p Y X X . Analytical solution, ( 0)p Y , for the propagating failure rate of node Y 
is very likely to be non-parametric due to its complicated functional form. For computational convenience, we use 
the approach in reference [15], [16] to approximate the propagating failure rate with a beta distribution having the 
same first two moments. Let beta(b,c) denote the beta distribution of the propagating failure rate of node Y. Then, 
the first two moments of this distribution are 
 
12( ) , ( ) ( )1 2 1
b bM E Y and M E Y E Y
b c b c  
(4) 
The first moment of p(Y=0) is the mean: 
 
( ( 0)) ( ( ( ) )) [ ( ( ) )]1M E p Y E CPD p PA Y k CPD E p PA Y jk k i
k k i  
(5) 
where j is the value for PAi(Y) in the set of k. For computational ease, Eq. (5) can be further written as the 
follows. 
 
1( ( 0)) { [ ( ( ) 0)]}1 2
siM E p Y CPD j E p PA Y CPD jk i i k i nik ki i  
(6) 
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The second moment of p(Y=0) is the mean of p(Y=0)2: 
 
1 ( 1)( 2)2 2( ( 0) ) 22 2 ( 2)( 3)
s s si i iM E p Y CPD j jk ii n n ni i ik i  
(7) 
Finally, we can define two parameters, b and c, for a beta distribution of p(Y=0) as 
 
( ) (1 )( )1 1 2 1 1 2,2 2( ) ( )2 21 1
M M M M M Mb c
M M M M  
(8) 
Now, node Y has two different beta distributions, one for inherent failure rate and one for propagating failure 
rates encapsulated in Eq. (8). These two beta distributions are integrated to get the new failure rate distribution of 
node Y. This task can be easily completed using the same process for obtaining fusion of all propagating failure 
information mentioned above, with different CPDs indicating 100% propagating effects. After applying these two 
fusion processes (the first being the fusion of propagating effects from dependent systems for the propagating failure 
rate and the second being the fusion of both inherent and propagating failure rates for the new integrated failure rate) 
to all nodes in a network, we can obtain the beta distributions of the new failure rate information including the 
propagating effects for all nodes. This result can be used to determine the critical (vulnerable) component and the 
expected development time for the SoS. 
2.3. Update of Failure Rates for all activities 
The failure rates of the system development may vary with time. If the system builder follows the schedule 
without any hiccups during the system development phase, development risk may decrease. In addition to evolution 
of the failure rates, uncertainty values in the failure rates of the systems decrease as time elapses. For example, 
assume that there are N times that the schedule is checked during a system development (Fig. 5). At each time step, 
a project manager estimates the failure rates of the system. In the beginning of the system development, uncertainty 
in the failure rates is high. However, once he knows the status of the system development at the time tn, he may 
estimate more accurate failure rates of building the system. Therefore, for an accurate and reliable result, the 
proposed method includes analysis of update of failure rates for all activities with uncertainty. 
 
Fig. 5. Uncertainty on the time steps 
In this paper, we use event tree analysis and beta distributions to update failure rates of all systems. An event tree 
is a commonly applied technique used for identifying the consequences following the occurrence of potential events 
such as failures or successes. It was first applied in risk assessments for the nuclear industry but is now utilized by 
other industries such as chemical processing, offshore oil and gas production, and transportation. We can estimate 
the outcome of the SoS development failure rate by quantifying the event tree diagram. Fig. 6 shows a very simple 
event tree structure for the development schedule of a SoS. All events are the scheduling checks during the SoS 
development. The branch points consider the failure and success of each event. The outcomes determined by the end 
point of each event tree branch identify a different value for failure or success following the initiating event. Total 
failure rate of a SoS development can be obtained by summing up all outcomes of failures at the end points of the 
event tree. If we know the initial failure rate and conditional probability of the system failure given the system 
failure or success at the previous step, then the event tree quantification is the simple task of multiplying the 
probabilities of passing along each branch point on any path through the diagram by the conditional probabilities. 
For example, let the initial system failure rate and conditional probabilities of the system failure probabilities given 
failure and success be P(Ft0)=0.1, P(Ft1|Ft0)=0.4, and P(Ft1|St0)=0.6. Then system failure rate P(Ft1) at time t1 can be 
calculated using the following equation. All failure rates at any time steps can be estimated in the same way. 
 
P(Ft1)= P(Ft0)× P(Ft1|Ft0)+{1- P(Ft0)}× P(Ft1|St0)=0.1×0.4+0.9×0.6=0.56
 
(9) 
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Fig. 6. A very simple event tree structure for an example development schedule 
The historical data is used to estimate the initial failure rate and conditional probability of the system failure. In 
the absence of such information, we can also use uninformative distributions as initial inputs such as, uniform 
distribution. As time elapses, we observe the results at each time step. These observations can be used to update 
conditional probabilities of the system failure by adding weighted numbers to parameters of beta distribution. This 
process allows uncertainty of the system failure to decrease as time goes by. 
3. Research Result – A Synthetic Demonstration Problem 
A simple synthetic problem is formulated and solved to demonstrate the proposed approach. Fig. 7 shows the 
representation of a five-system network, where, the development of system 1, here denoted by S1, depends on the 
development of system 2, 3, and 5. This implies that a failure from one system development process affects the 
development of dependent systems due to requirement interdependencies between systems. For system 1, a failure 
cascades from system 2, 3, and 5 to system 1. The T values indicate the requirement dependency strength and 
correspond to the conditional probability of a failure propagating to a dependent system. For instance, if system 3 
fails, then system 1 has 25% of chance to fail by a propagating effect of the system 4 failure. In order to estimate the 
requirement dependency strengths for all pair of systems, all systems should be decomposed into requirements and 
further into constituent systems. Then connectivity matrix and system readiness levels (SRLs) can be obtained using 
requirement relationships and TRL/IRL of constituent systems. Finally, the proposed method mentioned in section 2 
allows us to estimate the requirement interdependency strengths. For simplicity, we skip over the detailed process 
entailed to obtain these values. The table in Fig. 7 summarizes initial failure rates for all systems and conditional 
distributions of failure rates in terms of beta distributions, and expected development time for each system.  
System 5
System 1
System 2
System 3 System 4
T12=0.16
T13=0.25
T15=0.20
T35=0.08 T45=0.02
T34=0.03
T24=0.16
T23=0.1
 
 
System Failure rate distribution P(Ftn|Stn-1) P(Ftn|Ftn-1)
Expected 
development time
System 1 Beta (10, 9) Beta (3,8) Beta (6,2) 6 (months)
System 2 Beta (3, 16) Beta (1,10) Beta (4,4) 8
System 3 Beta (6, 13) Beta (3,8) Beta (3,5) 5
System 4 Beta (9, 9) Beta (4,7) Beta (5,3) 9
System 5 Beta (12,3) Beta (5,6) Beta (7,1) 6
* F: Failure, S: Success, tn: time n, tn-1: time n-1
 
Fig. 7. A five system development network and all input information for the analysis 
Consider the information fusion of failure rates of system 2, 3, and 5 with system 1 (Fig. 8). System 1 is 
connected to three dependent systems, 2, 3, and 5, with interdependency strength of 0.16, 0.25, and 0.20 
respectively. Systems 2, 3, and 5 have their own inherent failure rates with beta distributions shown in Fig. 8a. The 
propagating failure rate on system 1 is easily calculated through the proposed approach, based on the given 
information about inherent failure rates and conditional probability for propagating effects. In Fig. 8, blue lines 
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denote the inherent failure rate distributions for systems and red lines denote the propagating failure rate on system 
1. The green line in Fig. 8b represents the integrated failure rate for system 1. The mean of the system 1 integrated 
failure rate represents an increase of 0.26 over its inherent rate value due to the propagating effects from dependent 
system failures. Fig. 9 shows the mean values of propagating effects for all systems. These values depend on the 
number of dependent systems and the failure rates of dependent systems. System 1 has the highest propagating 
effects, indicating strong dependencies with numerous other systems. It also has a higher probability to be disrupted 
by the failure of other systems during the development process. Since it is hard to control this kind of failure, the 
design team for system 1 should consider these propagating effects when scheduling the development time.  
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Fig. 8. Information fusion of failure rates of system 2, 3, and 5 with system 1 
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Fig. 9. Mean values for failure rates propagating to systems 
The same synthetic problem is now used to measure the effects of disruptions and dependencies. The total 
expected development time is adopted to measure development time of a SoS capability. We assume that each 
system manager sets up the expected development time for their system as defined in the table in Fig. 7, indicating 
that in the absence of any failures, each system can be completed in the expected development time. Each system 
also has a development delay time due to its failure rate, calculated as the product of failure rate and the expected 
development time. For instance, if a system’s failure rate is 0.6 and expected development time for the system is 1, 
then the project team of this system needs 1.6 times the normal duration to complete it. Therefore, the total expected 
development time can be formulated as the follows: 
i
ii timetdevelopmenexpectedratefailuretimetdevelopmenexpectedTotal )1(
     
(10) 
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 Table 1 shows the expected development time with/without considering disruption and dependency effects. The 
disruption and dependency effects increase total development time by 1.6 times. This schedule overrun usually ends 
up with cost overruns. Therefore when decision makers take a decision on a new SoS capability, 
disruption/dependency levels of required systems should be considered. 
Table 1. Disruption and dependency effects to expected development time 
Systems 
Expected development time (months) 
without disruption & 
dependency effects 
with disruption effects & 
without dependency 
with disruption & 
dependency effects 
System 1 6 9.1 10.7 
System 2 8 9.2 10.8 
System 3 5 6.5 7.6 
System 4 9 13.4 13.9 
System 5 6 10.7 11.5 
Total 34 48.9 54.5 
 
Suppose there are 10 time steps for scheduling checks during the development process. In the beginning of the 
SoS development, it it hard for decision makers to estimate whether this project will end on time or not due to the 
high uncertainty. However, as time goes by, decision makers gain confidence in the results. Fig. 10 (a) shows this 
pattern using the mean values of the integrated failure rate of system 4 with 95% confidence interval. In this case, 
we use the best case scenario to run the simulation, indicating that all schedules at every time step are met on time. 
These observations are also applied to update failure rate of system 4. Fig. 10 (b) represents three different cases - 
best, worst, and expected, of integrated failure rates of system 4. All observations in the worst case are failures to 
achieve the schedule at each time step. We also draw numbers from beta distribution of integrated failure rate at the 
previous step to define the expected case. System 4 can lie anywhere in between best and worst cases. If the 
integrated failure rates of system 4 shows an increasing pattern then decision makers need to devote more attention 
to system 4 or substitute it with an alternative system.  
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(a)                                                                                     (b) 
Fig. 10. (a) Mean values of integrated failure rate of system 4 with 95% confidence interval, (b) Mean values of integrated failure rate of system 4 
in three different cases 
4. Conclusion 
The development process of a system-of-systems capability is often affected by risks arising from 
interdependencies between constituent systems during the development life cycle. This paper adopts a Bayesian 
Network approach to analyze interdependencies using constituent system failure rates and requirement dependency 
strengths between systems. Propagating failure rates are calculated to describe interdependencies, with inherent 
failure rates being evaluated for individual systems. By the integration of these two failure rates, both currently 
expressed as beta distributions, a new failure rate distribution is achieved that holistically represents the true risk and  
accurately determines the critical components. Uncertainty represented in a Bayesian Network using beta 
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distributions allows for enhanced robustness of model outcomes. Event trees are used to show evolution of 
constituent system failure rates during the development process. Results that consider both evolution of constituent 
system failure rates and propagating effects can help to manage risk in development of a SoS with complex 
interdependencies. 
A simple, synthetic five-system SoS problem demonstrates the proposed framework. Results show the increase in 
integrated failure rate due to the propagating effects of interdependencies. The comparison of integrated failure rates 
among all systems is useful in identifying the most critical system in terms of which system generates the most 
vulnerability to propagating effects from dependent systems. 
 The specific Bayesian Network formulation approach in this paper rests on two basic assumptions. First, systems 
can only have one of two discrete states, such as ‘working’ or ‘failure’; thus continuous variables such as 
development percentage cannot be expressed directly.  Second, the interdependency strengths between systems are 
assumed constant; thus there is no evolution of the interdependency strengths. Future work will address the 
relaxation of these assumptions. Furthermore, there is a need to develop a strategic action tool, as shown in the 
overview of the integrated simulation model in Fig. 1. This tool will allow decision makers to take better decisions 
in a SoS development process. 
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